EMPLOYMENT

DETAILS

COMMUTING COMPENSATION ACT 2029

SECTION 1: DEFINITIONS

• (1) "Commuting time" means the time spent by a worker travelling between their primary residence and their usual place of work, from the moment of departure until arrival.

• (2) "Excessive commuting time" means a daily return commute exceeding 60 minutes in total.

• (3) "Reasonable travel time" means the first 30 minutes each way (60 minutes total daily), which shall not require compensation.

SECTION 2: EMPLOYER OBLIGATIONS

• (1) Compensation for Excessive Commuting Time

  • Employers must compensate workers for 50% of their hourly wage for time exceeding the "reasonable travel time" threshold.

  • Example: A worker with a 2-hour daily return commute (120 mins) would be compensated for 60 mins (120 - 60 mins reasonable) at 50% pay.

  • Cap: No more than 5 hours per week may be claimed.

• (2) Flexible & Remote Work Mitigation

  • Employees will be given a legal right to work from home from the first day of their employment where their role permits.

  • Employers must offer at least 3 days per week remote work where role permits to reduce commuting burdens.

  • If remote work is impossible, employers must permit flexible hours to avoid peak travel times.

• (3) Travel Cost Support

  • Employers must provide one of the following:

    • Subsidy covering 50% of public transport costs;

    • Interest-free season ticket loan; or

    • Participation in a Cycle-to-Work scheme.

SECTION 3: WORKER RIGHTS & ENFORCEMENT

• (1) Record-Keeping

  • Workers may log commuting times via a verified app/tool (e.g., GPS or transport receipts).

  • Employers must retain records for 2 years.

• (2) Opt-Out for Time-in-Lieu

  • Workers may choose to bank compensated commute time as paid leave instead of monetary payment.

• (3) Redress for Non-Compliance

  • Workers may file a claim with an Employment Tribunal for unpaid compensation.

  • Tribunals may order retrospective payments + 5% penalty interest.

SECTION 4: EXEMPTIONS & IMPLEMENTATION

• (1) Small Businesses of less than 50 employees may defer compliance for 24 months.

• (2) Sector Exceptions:

  • Roles requiring physical presence (e.g., healthcare, construction) may substitute compensation with enhanced travel subsidies.

SECTION 5: TAX TREATMENT

• (1) Compensated commuting time payments shall be tax-exempt up to £2,000/year.

• (2) Employer-provided travel subsidies shall not count as taxable benefits.
  

SECTION 6: COMMENCEMENT & REVIEW

• (1) This Act shall come into force 12 months after passing.

• (2) A review clause after 3 years to assess impacts on productivity and labour costs.

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EXPLANATORY NOTES

• Policy Intent: To mitigate the "time tax" of unpaid commutes, improve work-life balance, and reduce transport congestion.

• Precedents: Draws on EU Working Time Directive principles and UK’s existing Cycle-to-Work tax relief.

• Employer Incentives: Reduced absenteeism, higher retention, and eligibility for Green Commute Tax Credits (if introduced).

JOB GUARANTEE

• This is an offer of alternative employment provided by the State for as long as the worker wants it, paid at a genuine living wage, performing socially useful work within one’s local community.

• It will be centrally funded but locally administered as the best people to decide what is beneficial for a community are the community members themselves.

• It is not mandatory to join and people who are certifiably not able to work will continue to be supported by a reintroduced Disability Living Allowance.

• Participants can work as much or as little as they wish or are able, are able to work flexibly around other commitments like childcare, and will be paid pro-rata if they choose less than full-time hours.

• It is not ‘workfare’ or other ‘work-for-benefits’ policies. It is a job like any other, which pays a wage plus benefits (holiday pay, sick pay, parental leave, National Insurance contributions, opportunities for training/upskilling in the workplace etc.) and so is far superior to what is currently available to those looking for work.

• It does not replace existing private and public sector jobs, but acts as an alternative for the unemployed and underemployed.

• It acts as an automatic stabiliser for the economy by taking on more workers during recessions and shedding them during recoveries, which will control inflation with a buffer stock of employment. This is a better approach than the current model of increasing unemployment because the Job Guarantee ensures those who lose their jobs still have an income, prevents them falling into the poverty trap, allows them to continue to participate in society, and it is better than a Universal Basic Income because UBI does not have an inflation stabilisation mechanism.

• Participants are free to leave whenever they wish or find better employment elsewhere. This is not a problem as the socially-beneficial work is envisioned as things that are ‘nice to have’ but are not essential, meaning it can be easily mothballed if there is no one to do it, and easily started up again when there is (essential public works should be carried out by public-sector workers). They are also free to stay working in the programme if they enjoy what they do.

• Jobs would be tailored to people as they currently are, i.e. participants do work that is already within their capabilities and as close to what they would desire to do for a career provided it is of benefit to society and their local community. Training would be available for those wanting to upskill.

• It does not compete with the public or private sector on wages, the work will always be paid at a genuine Living Wage rate, setting a floor for those sectors to match or better, avoiding inflationary wage spirals.

• The private sector cannot provide full employment because labour is a cost to them which they rightfully try to minimise, so the State has a moral responsibility to act as the employer of last resort for those who cannot find work elsewhere. Setting a wage floor incentivises private businesses to either offer better pay and/or conditions to tempt staff away from JG work, or to invest in other ways of getting the work done such as automation. Automating processes leads to productivity increases and higher standards of living as result, and frees people from boring, dead-end, repetitive, and meaningless work.

• It is superior to income guarantees because it allows people to continue to participate in society without turning them into passive consumption units. There are other benefits to work that a UBI would not provide such as socialisation, maintaining and improvement of skills, and a sense of meaning and purpose. It also prevents people on the programme being seen as receiving ‘something for nothing' and becoming stigmatised because they are giving up their time in service of others. People who perform tough, societally-necessary jobs like waste collection and sewage treatment works will very quickly start to begrudge people who are getting an income but do not contribute anything to the societal good in order to receive it. Social scientists have done a lot of work in this area and have found that work is still regarded as a central aspect of life and that this translates into firm views regarding mutual obligation and how much support should be provided to the unemployed. UBI advocates may well wish this was not the case but it is, and policy must be based on where society currently is, not where we might wish them to be. Before decoupling the concept of work from income, the scope of work needs to be greatly expanded beyond the current paradigm of 'go to a building and make money for someone else' and into socially-beneficial work within all local communities so that everyone can begin to see that 'unprofitable' activities are actually of value to society.

• It is pro-work, anti-poverty and satisfies the innate human desire for fairness i.e. that those who can contribute to the societal good should in order to receive an income from it. Surveys also indicate that the vast majority of unemployed workers would prefer to work instead of being given a handout.

• It is good for business because they can let staff go if they need to cut costs without the staff being thrown into poverty, or if a particular sector is running too hot and needs to cool down, and can hire them back from the Job Guarantee (if they haven’t found better work elsewhere) once the sector recovers and sees rising demand again. This also acts as an inflation buffer by giving people alternative employment rather than letting them rot on the dole, which keeps productive output at a constant level.

• A Job Guarantee is also good for workers because it gives them something with which to bargain. Workers can withdraw their labour and disrupt business operations in order to obtain a better deal from their employer. UBI recipients would have no such power and be entirely reliant on the mercy of the government of the day to increase their payment in line with inflation. If that didn't happen, it would not be too long before the UK finds itself back at the poverty levels of the 1930s.

• It can be used to provide tapered support for aspiring business owners to open a business, establish themselves and become a sustainable entity. The taper would vary depending on the sector in which the business operates.

  • They would receive the JG wage as their personal income.

  • Funding to cover business costs (rent, rates, stock etc) would be provided by microloans or grants from the Bank of England to a National Entrepreneurship Fund which is administered by a new Public Investment Bank. The PIB will scrutinise applicants’ business plans and allocate funding to viable proposals on condition the recipients complete business development training, engage with mentors, and undergo audits. This allows new businesses to access the startup capital required without having to offer up collateral to a traditional bank, because the government’s goal is full employment not profit.

  • Approved businesses would need to serve some public purpose such as working in/with other JG programmes, providing goods/services to them, or providing employment opportunities to other JG workers until the support period is up.

  • Once the support period is over, the owner would be expected to repay the NEF/PIB’s investment in them via a revenue sharing agreement e.g. 5% per year, ensuring they can continue to operate but without putting them in financial jeopardy, and encourages them to treat the investment seriously rather than as free money. Repayment is their ‘thank-you’ to society for investing in them and allowing them to build themselves up.

  • Our proposed model is this:

    • Phase 1: Full JG Support (1–3 Years)

      • Covers living wage + training/mentorship.

      • Grants or 0% loans for startup costs

    • Phase 2: Partial Support (Years 3–5)

      • JG wage tapers (e.g. 50% of baseline) as business revenue grows.

      • Contingent repayment begins if profitability thresholds are met.

    • Phase 3: Post-Graduation (Year 5+)

      • JG exits, but safety net remains:

      • Revenue-sharing loans (if applicable).

      • Emergency 6-month reinstatement (e.g., for recessions or supply shocks).

    • Triggers to Exit JG:

      • Revenue covers owner’s living wage + 25% operating costs for 6+ months.

      • Equity/debt financing secured.

SECTOR-SPECIFIC ADJUSTMENTS

• Consulting/Sole Proprietor

  • JG Duration: 2–3 years

  • Exit Criteria: Stable client base

• Restaurant/Retail

  • Duration: 3–4 years

  • Exit: 12 months of profitability

• Hardware/Manufacturing

  • Duration: 5–7 years

  • Exit: Prototype-to-production milestone

SOURCES

• https://billmitchell.org/blog/?p=41399

• https://billmitchell.org/blog/?p=41403

PART 1: FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES

SECTION 1: RIGHT TO WORK

• 1. Every UK resident aged 16 or over has the legal right to a Job Guarantee (JG) position, provided they are willing and able to work.

• 2. The State shall serve as the employer of last resort, offering JG roles at a wage no lower than the Real Living Wage (as defined by the Living Wage Foundation) plus pension, holiday, and sick leave entitlements.

SECTION 2: FUNDING

• 1. Funding for the JG shall rise and fall in line with the number of workers entering and exiting the programme, acting as a counter-cyclical automatic stabiliser for the economy. There shall be no maximum financial limit per year as the government acknowledges that its role as the national currency issuer provides it with an unlimited fiscal capacity.

• 2. The Bank of England shall provide all funding to the Job Guarantee Office directly.

PART 2: INSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS

SECTION 3: JOB GUARANTEE OFFICE (JGO)

• 1. A permanent independent body, the JGO, shall administer the Job Guarantee and make payments to workers, with governance including:

  • 5 Parliament-appointed directors.

  • 4 worker representatives elected by JG participants.

  • 2 delegates from the Trades Union Congress (TUC).

• 2. This body may only be dissolved by a two-thirds majority vote of Parliament.

SECTION 4: DECENTRALISED JOB CREATION

• Jobs may be proposed by any member of a local community and scrutinised by a Local Job Guarantee Board to determine the social benefits derived from each proposal. Job proposers may appeal to the JGO if the LJGB rules against their proposal.

• LJGBs must include:

  • 3 local council members.

  • 2 JG worker delegates.

  • 1 representative from local SMEs and 1 from civil society (e.g., environmental NGOs).

PART 3: ANTI-SABOTAGE PROTECTIONS

SECTION 5: SUPERMAJORITY REPEAL CLAUSE

• 1. Any bill to alter or abolish the Job Guarantee, or change its funding or administrative arrangements requires:

  • A 67% majority in the House of Commons, and;

  • A referendum approved by 67% of voters on a minimum 75% turnout.

SECTION 6: TRANSITIONAL GUARANTEES

• 1. If the Job Guarantee is terminated, all participants shall receive:

  • 12 months of wage parity via Universal Credit.

  • First refusal on equivalent public-sector roles.

SECTION 7: JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT

• 1. JG participants may sue the government for non-compliance under judicial review.

• 2. Courts shall interpret this Act liberally to favour access to work.

JOB GUARANTEE ACT 2029

LIVING WAGE ACT 2029

PURPOSE:

To end in-work poverty by making the Real Living Wage (as calculated by the Living Wage Foundation) the legal minimum wage for all workers in the UK.

KEY PROVISIONS:

• Statutory Alignment with LWF Rates

  • The National Living Wage (NLW) and National Minimum Wage (NMW) will be merged into one, and must match the LWF’s annual Real Living Wage rates.

  • Rates will be updated in line with LWF announcements.

• Reform of the Low Pay Commission (LPC)

  • The LPC’s role will shift from recommending wage rates to enforcing the LWF’s calculations.

  • The LPC must conduct an annual review to ensure compliance.

• Enforcement & Penalties

  • Employers failing to pay the Real Living Wage will face fines of up to 200% of underpaid wages, similar to current NMW enforcement.

  • HMRC’s enforcement budget will be increased to ensure compliance.

• Regional Adjustments (London Weighting)

  • The London Living Wage (higher due to costs) will apply automatically to workers in Greater London.

JUSTIFICATION:

• Economic & Social Benefits

  • Reduces in-work poverty – currently 1 in 5 UK workers earn below the Real Living Wage.

  • Boosts productivity & retention as evidence shows higher wages reduce staff turnover.

  • Saves money due to fewer benefits claims from those already in work (e.g., Universal Credit top-ups).

  • Reestablishes the principle that businesses should pay their own labour costs, and not rely on the State to subsidise their greed.

• Public Support

  • 78% of Brits support a wage tied to living costs (YouGov, 2023).

  • Over 14,000 employers already pay the voluntary Real Living Wage.

IMPLEMENTATION:

• 2029: Bill introduced in Parliament.

• 2030: LPC transitions to LWF-aligned rates and full enforcement begins.

NEW SALARY SYSTEM

PURPOSE:

• Establish a new method of wage-setting, based on social utility rather than market profitability, to ensure wages received reflect the actual value workers in each industry contribute to society.

ABOLITION OF MARKET WAGE SETTING:

• A National Pay Commission (NPC) would assign all salaries based on:

  • Social value metrics (e.g., health impact, education, decarbonisation).

  • Public deliberation (citizen juries rank professions).

  • ONS Standard Occupation Codes for categorisation.

• Example Pay Hierarchy:

  • Tier 1 (£80k+): Nurses, teachers, climate engineers.

  • Tier 2 (£50k–£70k): Public transit planners, social workers, farmers.

  • Tier 3 (£30k–£50k): Artists, tradespeople, small-business employees.

  • Tier 4 (<£30k): Speculative finance, luxury marketing.

STRICT CAPITAL CONTROLS:

• To prevent the greedy and undeserving fleeing, we would introduce a tiered Exit Tax and a one-time 'Lookback' Tax.

RIGHT TO WORK FROM HOME

WORKING FROM HOME (LEGAL RIGHT) ACT 2029 / AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ACT 1996

An Act to establish a default right to remote work for eligible employees, and to rebalance power in the workplace. The Covid-19 pandemic conclusively proved that 99.9% of office jobs can be done just as well from home, and the only reason employers are ordering staff back into offices is to regain the control that was taken away from them. This is a detriment to what is actually beneficial for their workers, and is being done out of ideology and spite. This law would not order people to work from home, it would simply allow those who prefer to not be in an office to do so without fear of reprimand or other penalties.

SECTION 1: A DEFAULT RIGHT TO WORK FROM HOME

• Any employee whose role was successfully performed from home during the COVID-19 pandemic (March 2020–July 2021), or at any point since then, has the automatic legal right to work remotely for the same proportion of time (i.e. full-time, hybrid) unless the employer can prove with objective evidence that:

  • The role can no longer be performed remotely due to material changes (e.g. new legal requirements, hardware dependencies).

  • The business would face severe operational collapse (not mere inconvenience or preference).

• New employees in roles deemed compatible with remote work (by sectoral standards set in regulations) may unilaterally elect to work from home from their first day.

SECTION 2: EMPLOYERS' BURDEN OF PROOF

• To deny WFH, the employer must apply to a Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) panel, proving:

  • Productivity dropped more than 20% in similar roles when WFH was attempted.

  • On-site work is legally mandated (e.g. security, healthcare, manufacturing).

  • Reasonable adjustments (e.g. IT support, equipment) would cost over 5% of the employer’s annual turnover. SMEs shall be exempted from this condition if it is determined to be genuinely unaffordable for them.

• "Because I said so" refusals are void. Tribunals may impose punitive fines (up to 10% of payroll) for bad-faith rejections.

SECTION 3: NO-RETALIATION CLAUSE

• Any dismissal, demotion, or harassment of an employee for exercising WFH rights is automatically unfair dismissal, with a minimum of £20,000 compensation per claim.

• Any employer maliciously reclassifying roles as defined in Section 1.1 as ‘non-remote’ or some other variation of this terminology can be referred to the CAC or employment tribunal. Being adjudicated to have reclassified with deliberate intent to deprive employees of remote working options will be punished with liability to cover all costs and ordered to allow employees to choose their preferred working arrangements.

SECTION 4: SECTOR-SPECIFIC REGULATIONS

• The Department for Business and Trade will define "remotely viable" roles by sector (e.g. IT, admin = presumptive WFH; nursing, construction = exempt).

SECTION 5: INELIGIBLE STAFF

• Staff in roles that are ineligible to work remotely or in a hybrid manner as defined in Section 4 will be entitled to:

  • Commute on public transport for free or receive 45p in mileage pay for every mile of said commute.

  • A £1,250 per year index-linked non-taxable tax credit as compensation for being unable to claim working-from-home tax relief.

  • A guaranteed interview for any internal role after 2 years in an on-site position.

  • Free upskilling if desiring to learn new skills unrelated to current role.

  • 14 days full-pay sick leave in contrast to the current statutory 7 days.

SECTION 6: ENFORCEMENT & PENALTIES

• Employees have an individual right to sue, and may take cases directly to tribunals without fees.

• Employers who systematically violate the law shall be publicly named-and-shamed.

• Unions may strike over WFH denials without cooling-off periods.

SECTION 7: COMMENCEMENT

· This Act shall come into force three months from the date it receives Royal Assent.

BENEFITS

• Forces employers to justify office mandates, not workers to justify WFH.

• If it worked in 2020, it must work now unless bosses can show new, legitimate barriers.

• Cuts commuting costs and travel time, which is effectively an indirect 7–15% pay rise for many.

MODEL REMOTE WORK POLICY

Effective Date: [DD/MM/YYYY]
Compliance With: Working From Home (Legal Right) Act 2029 / Employment Rights Act 1996

1. DEFAULT RIGHT TO REMOTE WORK

• All employees in roles previously performed remotely during COVID-19 (March 2020–July 2021) have an automatic right to work from home (WFH) under the same terms (full-time, hybrid, or agreed schedule).

• New hires in remotely viable roles (see Schedule A) may notify the company of their WFH election from their first day of employment. No permission is required.

2. EMPLOYER'S LIMITED GROUNDS FOR REFUSAL

The company may only override WFH rights if it can prove one or more of the following:

• Legal/regulatory requirement: The role must be performed on-site (e.g., security clearance, lab work).

• Severe operational harm: Remote work would cause more than 20% productivity loss which can be verified by past data.

• Excessive cost: Adjustments (e.g., equipment, cybersecurity) exceed 5% of annual turnover (SME exemption applies).

Process for Refusal:

• The company must issue a written denial within 14 days, citing evidence (e.g. productivity reports, cost analysis).

• Employees may appeal to the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC). During appeal, WFH shall continue unless legally prohibited.

3. EQUIPMENT & EXPENSES

• The company will provide:

  • Laptop, VPN, and necessary software.

  • £500/year stipend for home office setup (tax-free under HMRC rules). This is because employees are bearing overhead costs that would be covered by their employer, and they are turning part of their home into a space to create value for their employer.

  • Reimbursement of mandatory work-related expenses (e.g., broadband if used more than 50% of the time for work).

4. HEALTH & SAFETY

• Employees must complete a self-assessment of their home workspace (ergonomics, electrical safety).

• The company will cover required adjustments (e.g., ergonomic chairs, monitor stands).

5. PERFORMANCE & MONITORING

• No punitive monitoring: No keystroke tracking, always-on webcams, or unannounced virtual "spot checks."

• Output-based evaluation: Performance assessed by deliverables, not hours logged.

6. NON-RETALIATION

• Any adverse action (e.g., denial of promotion, schedule changes) against an employee for exercising WFH rights will be treated as unlawful discrimination.

• Penalties: Automatic 6 months’ pay + reinstatement if upheld at tribunal.

7. SCHEDULE A: "REMOTELY VIABLE" ROLES

(Example classifications - to be adapted per sectoral regulations)
Fully Remote Eligible: Software developers, HR, accounting, customer service (phone/email).
Hybrid Eligible (min. 3 days WFH): Marketing, project management, recruitment.
On-Site Required: Nurses, warehouse staff, electricians.

8. GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

• Internal appeal to People Team (7-day response required).

• CAC mediation (if unresolved).

• Employment tribunal at no cost to employee.

WHY THIS POLICY WORKS

• Bulletproof compliance pre-empts tribunal claims by codifying the law’s requirements.

• Employees notify, not ask, giving them power at work. Refusals are rare and evidence-heavy.

• Focus shifts to productivity with dystopian surveillance banned. Output matters, not presenteeism.

STATUTORY DEFINITION OF 'WORKER' AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ACT 1996

SECTION 1: WORKER STATUS

• (1) For the purposes of this Act, a "worker" is an individual who:

  • (a) performs work or services personally for another party (the "employer"), unless the employer can prove the individual operates a genuinely independent business (see subsection 2); and

  • (b) lacks unfettered discretion to decline work without penalty, or is integrated into the employer’s operational structure (e.g., subjected to shifts, uniforms, performance metrics, or disciplinary procedures); an

  • (c) is not, in reality, a client or customer of the employer.

• (2) A "genuinely independent business" requires proof of all the following:

  • (a) The individual markets their services publicly to multiple clients; and

  • (b) They bear significant financial risk (e.g., fixed-term liabilities, capital investment); and

  • (c) They have unrestricted rights to hire substitutes without employer approval; and

  • (d) They set their own key contractual terms (e.g., pricing, scope, deadlines).

• (3) Irrelevance of Contractual Terms

  The label or terms of any agreement (e.g., "self-employed," "zero-hours," "Limb (b)") are not determinative. Status depends on the actual working relationship, assessed by:

  • (a) Control: The employer’s authority over work performance, schedules, or discipline;

  • (b) Mutuality of Obligation: Whether the employer must offer work and the individual must accept it;

  • (c) Economic Dependency: Whether the individual relies on the employer for 50%+ of their income.

• (4) Presumption of Worker Status

  • Where an individual challenges their classification, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to disprove worker status under subsections (1)–(3).

• (5) Anti-Avoidance

  • Any attempt to circumvent this section via artificial contracting structures (e.g., mandatory "sole trader" agreements, intermediary companies) is void.

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BENEFITS:

• 1. Closes the "personal service" loophole by banning sham substitution clauses (e.g. Uber’s "right to substitute" ruled illusory in Aslam v Uber).

• 2. Targets bogus self-employment by requiring proof of genuine entrepreneurship (e.g. marketing to multiple clients, financial risk).

• 3. Neutralizes zero-hours exploitation by covering cases where workers are punished for refusing shifts e.g. Pimlico Plumbers v Smith.

• 4. Shifts burden to employers: Ends "contractual labelling" games by prioritizing real-world conditions.

WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY ACT 2029

A FRAMEWORK FOR EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, OWNERSHIP, AND DECISION-MAKING POWER IN UK BUSINESSES

1. INTRODUCTION

The UK economy suffers from low productivity, stagnant wages, and declining worker satisfaction. Research shows that employee engagement and workplace democracy improve innovation, job satisfaction, and long-term business resilience. This proposal outlines legislative reforms to give workers a meaningful say in corporate governance, ensuring fairer decision-making and economic stability.

2. KEY OBJECTIVES

• Increase worker influence over corporate decisions affecting jobs and livelihoods.

• Promote employee ownership and profit-sharing to reduce inequality.

• Strengthen collective bargaining to improve wages and conditions.

• Enhance corporate accountability by aligning business decisions with worker interests.

3. POLICY MEASURES

• A. Mandatory Worker Representation on Boards (Co-Determination)

  • Large firms (250+ employees) must allocate 1/3 of board seats to elected worker representatives.

  • Very large firms (5,000+ employees) must adopt 50% worker representation (similar to Germany’s Mitbestimmung).

  • Worker representatives will be elected by staff via secret ballot, with protections against dismissal.

• B. Employee Veto Rights on Major Decisions

  • Companies must hold consultations and advisory votes before implementing:

    • Large-scale layoffs (affecting >10% of workforce).

    • Relocations or office closures.

    • Major restructuring (e.g., outsourcing, mergers, working patterns).

  • If >50% of workers oppose a decision, the company must:

    • Delay implementation for 90 days for negotiation.

    • Provide an alternative plan with worker approval.

• C. Right to Request Workplace Democracy

  • Employees in firms with 50+ staff can petition for:

    • An elected works council (with binding consultation rights).

    • A transition to partial or full employee ownership.

  • Employers must respond within 60 days with a justification if rejecting the request.

• D. Expansion of Employee Ownership & Profit-Sharing

  • Tax incentives for companies converting to employee ownership trusts (EOTs) or cooperatives.

  • "Right to Buy" for Workers: If a firm is sold or enters insolvency, employees have first refusal to purchase it as a cooperative, backed by low-interest government loans.

  • Mandatory profit-sharing for companies with 250+ employees, distributing 5% of profits to staff.

• E. Strengthening Trade Unions & Collective Bargaining

  • Repeal restrictive laws (e.g., 2016 Trade Union Act thresholds).

  • Introduce sectoral bargaining in key industries (e.g., retail, logistics) to set minimum standards.

  • Ban "fire and rehire" tactics without worker consent.

• F. Workplace Democracy Commission

  • A new independent regulator to:

    • Enforce worker representation laws.

    • Resolve disputes between staff and management.

    • Promote best practices in workplace democracy.

4. IMPLEMENTATION & TRANSITION

• Phased rollout over 5 years to allow businesses to adapt.

• Exemptions for SMEs (under 50 employees) to reduce administrative burdens.

• Funding & Support: Grants for training worker representatives and transitioning to employee ownership.

5. EXPECTED OUTCOMES

• Higher productivity & innovation through increased worker engagement.

• Reduced inequality via profit-sharing and ownership models.

• Greater job security with worker input on layoffs and restructuring.

• Stronger corporate accountability, reducing short-term profit-driven decisions.

6. CONCLUSION

The Workplace Democracy Act would rebalance power in the UK economy, ensuring workers have a fair say in their workplaces while maintaining business competitiveness. By borrowing successful models from Germany, Spain, and employee-owned UK firms, this policy offers a pragmatic yet transformative approach to economic fairness.

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